Who is bombing libya 2011




















Libya After Qaddafi: lessons and implications for the future. Rand Corporation. Stuenkel, O. The impact of the Libya intervention debates on norms of protection. Global Society , 30 1 , pp.

Military Review , 90 1 , p. Gaddafi, M. Oakland: University of California Press. Brockmeier, S. Chivvis, C. Garrett, W. Krasner, S. Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables.

International organization , 36 2 , pp. Lawson, S. Conceptual issues in the comparative study of regime change and democratization. Comparative Politics , pp. Pattison, J. Wedgwood, A. Barfi, B. BBC News. Becker, J. Castle, T. Chivers, C. Enders, D. Its actions reveal it was looking for regime change. By Micah Zenko. The new Libyan flag is raised during a parade in the eastern city of Benghazi to celebrate the second anniversary of Nato's first military operation in Libya on March 19, On 19 March , Kadhafi's troops and tanks entered the city and the same day French forces began an international military intervention in Libya, later joined by coalition forces with strikes against armoured units south of Benghazi and attacks on Libyan air-defence systems, after UN Security Council Resolution called for using "all necessary means" to protect Libyan civilians and populated areas from attack by government forces.

March 22, , AM. Analysis Jason Pack. Report Colum Lynch. Explainer Amy Mackinnon. What in the World? November 12, , PM. Trending 1. Blame Brussels. Even President Obama himself would eventually acknowledge the failure to stay engaged.

In other words, even this "worst-case scenario" falls well short of actual worst-case scenarios. According to the Libya Body Count, around 4, people have so far been killed over the course of 22 months of civil war. In Syria, the death toll is about times that, with more than , killed , according to the Syrian Center for Policy Research.

Would that undermine support for the original intervention? It was wrong because the decision to intervene in the first place was not justified, being based as it was on faulty premises regarding weapons of mass destruction.

If Iraq had quickly turned out "well" and become a relatively stable, flawed, yet functioning democracy, would that have retroactively justified an unjustified war?

Presumably not, even though we would all be happy that Iraq was on a promising path. The near reverse holds true for Libya. The justness of military intervention in March cannot be undone or negated retroactively. This is not the way choice or morality operates imagine applying this standard to your personal life. This may suggest a broader philosophical divergence: Obama, according to one of his aides , is a "consequentialist.

Was the rightness of stopping the Rwandan genocide dependent on whether Rwanda could realistically become a stable democracy after the genocide was stopped? The idea that Libya, because it had oil and a relatively small population, would have been a relatively easy case was an odd one. Qaddafi had made sure, well in advance, that a Libya without him would be woefully unprepared to reconstruct itself. For more than four decades, he did everything in his power to preempt any civil society organizations or real, autonomous institutions from emerging.

Paranoid about competing centers of influence, Qaddafi reduced the Libyan army to a personal fiefdom. Unlike other Arab autocracies, the state and the leader were inseparable. Americans are probably more likely to consider the Libya intervention a failure because the US was at the forefront of the NATO operation. He was a threat to his own people, and that was about it. We could have claimed to have "done no harm," even though harm, of course, would have been done.

There was a time when the United States seemed to have a perpetual bias toward action. The instinct of leaders, more often than not, was to act militarily even in relatively small conflicts that were remote from American national security interests.

Kirkpatrick, D. Ali Zway and K. Kuperman, A. CrossRef Google Scholar. Lambroschini, A. Levinson, C. Lynch, C. Lyons, J. Malye, F. McGreal, C.

Miller, G. Milne, S. Nakhoul, S. Nordland, R. Nossiter, A. Pelham, N.



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